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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• The recent shift in European trade policy to negotiate bilateral agreements with no less 
than 24 countries is taking Europe into dangerous waters. In contrast to bilaterals envisa-
ged by Chile, Japan, Korea, Singapore and the U.S., the bilaterals considered by the EC 
are characterized by high tariffs and non-tariff barriers in goods, and by restrictive regu-
lations in services and investment.
• Multilateral liberalization of trade should be the centre of European trade strategy. The 
EC trade negotiators in industrial goods (NAMA) should aim (or should have aimed) at 
achieving what the European business community is asking for – namely no single indu-
strial tariff above 15 percent. Such a target makes good economic sense. It would elimi-
nate the tariff peaks that constitute the main obstacle faced by the European exporters, 
and that generate most of the protection costs imposed on the consumers in the rest of 
the world. Furthermore, it would increase the certainty of access to emerging markets 
for European exporters, and should make it easier to negotiate exceptions as simple and 
as predictable as possible.
• Applied to nine major emerging countries, the paper gives a concrete sense of the chan-
ges in protection associated with this 15 percent target and to simple and predictable 
exceptions.  The emerging countries would then exhibit average bound tariffs ranging 
from 6.7 to 14.7 percent, with a maximum bound tariff of 50 percent (but only a tiny 
proportion of the bound tariffs would be higher than 30 percent). Effective cuts in average 
applied tariffs are limited to three emerging countries, but the average tariff water would 
be eliminated or sharply reduced.
• The EC position in the WTO agricultural negotiations should be rebalanced by a more 
extensive cut in the high tariffs and a smaller cut of the low tariffs. This would deliver 
more economic gains to the European consumers than the current EC proposal, and it 
would leverage political benefits since a vast majority of EC farm and food producers (all 
those protected by small and moderate tariffs) would find the rebalancing of the EC tariff 
proposal favorable to their interests, compared to the current EC offer.
• The results of such a rebalanced position would meet the two key criteria set for the 
Doha Round – namely, “less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments”, and “comparably 
high level of ambition in market access for Agriculture and NAMA”.
• The EC should position itself as a WTO Member with a long term view of the world 
trade regime. Assuming responsibility for the future relevance of the world trading system 
is a sign of leadership. Europe implicitly assumes that future rounds of trade negotiations 
will follow after a successful Doha Round. Those future rounds will address the unfinished 
business left by (perhaps) a more modest but a “clean” Doha outcome much more easily 
than if they inherit a Doha package more ambitious for some products, but riddled with 
more distortive exceptions on many products. In short, the ECs long term strategy should 
be to promote a series of WTO Rounds of liberalization as a slow but nonetheless peren-
nial “peeling of the protectionist onion”.
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Introduction
The European Community (EC) is playing a key role 
in trade negotiations. But, this is due much more to its 
mere size in the current world economy than because 
of a leadership based on innovative initiatives. The Doha 
Round negotiations at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) have repeatedly witnessed an EC out of touch 
with the rest of the world―from dragging its feet in mar-
ket access (in agriculture) to tabling schemes (such as 
competition policy) much too complex for most of 
the very heterogeneous WTO membership. And the 
EC safeguards or ambiguous attitude vis-à-vis develop-
ing countries make the self-proclaimed “multilateralist” 
credentials of the EC look more like a way of bickering 
with the US than an accurate description of the EC posi-
tion.
The rapid emergence of potentially much larger econ-
omies in Asia implies that the advantage that the EC gets 
from its relative economic size will fade away, possibly 
at a rapid pace. The EC trade policy is thus at the cross-
roads. Should it continue on the current trend, with the 
risk of becoming an increasing burden in the world trade 
forum? Or should it recognize its long-term interests as 
those of a “diminishing giant”, and launch appropriate 
innovative initiatives?
There is thus an urgent need for assessing the cur-
rent EC trade policy in goods. Section 1 starts by analys-
ing the recent Commission’s proposal on bilateral trade 
agreements. It shows that the bilateral trade agreements 
contemplated by the Commission are characterized by 
trade preferences so substantial that they could easily 
create severe trade distortions costly for both European 
consumers and producers. By contrast, the alternative 
option―a successful Doha Round―would provide substan-
tial benefits to the EC for two reasons. The EC is one of 
the world’s worst offenders in agricultural protection 
and a highly protected services provider (as most WTO 
Members). As a region with (a much) lower growth than 
large parts of the rest of the world, the EC has a crucial 
interest to remain in close contact with the fastest grow-
ing economies.
The rest of the paper assesses the EC policy in the 
Doha Round by presenting alternatives detailed enough 
to give a concrete sense of the issues at stake and of 
the outcomes within reach. If the current negotiations 
fail―or if there is a last minute change of opinion―within 
the next few weeks, these alternatives could offer fresh 
options. If the current negotiations succeed, they offer 
a benchmark for assessing the outcome of the current 
EC policy.
The crux of every Round is the trade-off between in-
creased market access and politically necessary excep-
tions (conveniently disguised as “flexibilities” in the Doha 
jargon). In their current haste to deliver, the Doha nego-
tiators seem to head for a package with increased mar-
ket access for “easy” products (those with initially small 
or moderate tariffs) combined with a host of exceptions 
for “difficult” products (those with high tariffs). Such a 
mix may increase the chances of getting a deal. But, it is 
almost certain to deliver a disappointing economic out-
come because consumers’ welfare gains are mostly gen-
erated by cuts in high tariffs, and because exporters find 
little comfort if only foreign low tariffs are dismantled, 
while the remaining high tariffs are frozen until the next 
Round. Ultimatly, an economically mediocre outcome 
is doomed to have a heavy political price, and to give a 
new blow to the WTO reputation.
Even in such a difficult context, the paper argues 
that the EC could―and should―(have) table(d) better pro-
posals. In a nutshell, a bolder EC approach would have 
much benefited from following the wise suggestion of 
the European business community in industry (Section 
3) and from tapping a potential degree of freedom in 
agriculture (Section 4). The detailed calculations made 
in order to provide a concrete sense of the alternatives 
suggest (much) higher welfare gains and―an attractive 
result―more political support than the support to be ex-
pected for the current EC proposals. Last but not least, 
these alternatives meet the two key constraints that the 
Doha negotiators have imposed on themselves – the “less 
than full reciprocity” and the “comparably high level of ambi-
tion in market access for Agriculture and [Industry]” condi-
tions (section 2).
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1. The 2006 Commisson’s  Proposal: 
Triggering a World Race to 
 Bilaterals?
Many observers argue that the WTO is so severely 
undermined by a lack of leadership (from the US as well 
as from the EC) that “regional trade agreements” are the 
only remaining option. The Commission’s working doc-
ument, released in November 2006, echoes this view.1 It 
reaffirms the EC support to the Doha negotiations. But, 
it develops such a massive European strategy in terms of 
future bilaterals no less than 24 with such a sense of ur-
gent need for action that it gives a strong impression of 
a deep change of course in European trade strategy. The 
European Parliament’s first reaction was rather nega-
tive, and a large share of the European business com-
munity remains unconvinced about the need to go on 
the bilateral track to such an extent.2 As of March 2007, 
the Council has not yet fully endorsed this programme 
of bilateral negotiations.
There is thus a serious need for assessing the Com-
mission’s programme. Indeed, it is worrisome that there 
has been no impact assessment study of such a deep and 
vast change of trade policy, quite contrary to the 2001 
Gothenburg Council decision requiring the Commis-
sion to make an impact assessment study of its propos-
als. Before providing a preliminary assessment of the 
Commission’s document, the “rise of regionalism” has 
to be put in an appropriate perspective.
The “Rise of Regionalism”: Perceptions vs R ealities3
Supporters of an increasing recourse to preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) see their views justified by the 
increasing number of PTAs notified to the WTO―211 as 
of September 2006. This figure strongly exaggerates and 
distorts the true importance of the rise of regionalism.
Firstly, the PTAs notified during the WTO years 
(post-1995) are overwhelmingly bilateral trade agree-
ments (hereafter “bilaterals”). This is in sharp contrast 
with those notified during the GATT years (pre-1995), 
which are almost equally split between bilaterals and “re-
gional” (more than two signatories) trade agreements. 
This structural change introduces a systematic overesti-
mate of the post-1995 number of the PTAs, compared 
to its pre-1995 level.4 Beyond the mere counting of 
deals, it also suggests a smaller economic impact of the 
post-1995 deals, since bilaterals are likely to be more 
severely constrained by restrictive rules of origin than 
regional trade agreements.5
Secondly, more than 30 percent of the current PTAs 
notified to the WTO consist of intra-European trade 
agreements (defined as deals between countries located 
on the European continent, excluding Belarus, Rus-
sia and Ukraine). This large number of intra-European 
deals mirrors the inefficient way (viewed in an institu-
tional perspective) Europeans are building their Single 
Market. Any trade deal negotiated by the EC generates 
almost mechanically “clone” deals by the European coun-
tries linked to the EC by trade agreements―the EFTA 
countries and Turkey (and Bulgaria and Romania before 
their accession in 2007). As a result, every time the EC 
trade policy changes, a vast number of bilaterals disap-
pear or emerge. The former was the case in 2004 when 
ten Central European countries joined the EC (more 
than a dozen bilaterals disappeared on the spot) and it 
will happen in 2007 when the 24 bilaterals between the 
eight Balkan countries which are not yet EC Members 
will be replaced by the unique agreement signed in De-
cember 2006. Symmetrically, the number of Europe-
related bilaterals will increase again if the EC decides 
to implement the above-mentioned policy of bilaterals 
tabled by the Commission.
Thirdly, the increase in the number of PTAs noti-
fied to the WTO reflects to some extent the increase of 
the WTO membership itself, as best illustrated by the 
substantial number of bilaterals between former Soviet 
Union republics, which have recently acceded to the 
WTO. Deflating the (increasing) number of PTAs by the 
(increasing) number of WTO Members suggests a much 
lower number of PTAs in 2006―about 50, rather than the 
211 usually mentioned.
Fourthly, the breakdown of the post-1995 non intra-
European bilaterals presents large countries as followers-
not as leaders, in sharp contrast to general belief. There 
is no bilateral between the top 10 economies (the 10 
largest GDPs under PPP-based exchange rates, taking 
into account individual EC Member states). There are 
only three bilaterals (on goods and services) between 
a top-10 and a top-20 economy (US-Australia, Japan-
Mexico and Thailand-Australia). Remarkably, the role of 
the US and the EC remains relatively limited. The EC is 
signatory of 16 percent of the post-1995 non-European 
bilaterals (12 percent for the US). This last observation 
deserves a remark. The language of the Commission’s 
proposal suggests that the EC is lagging behind in terms 
of bilaterals. But in fact the EC remains the most im-
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portant source of bilaterals among the large economies, 
even if one ignores the intra-European deals.6
Lastly, the assertion that bilaterals are quickly con-
cluded is not substantiated in the EC case. The negoti-
ating time needed by the EC for concluding bilaterals 
with non-European countries has ranged from 2 years 
with Chile to 5 years with Mexico. Negotiations with 
the ACP and Mercosur countries have already lasted 4 
and 11 years respectively, without delivering a success-
ful outcome. The comparison is far to be as unfavorable 
to the WTO negotiations as many believe.
Assessing the 2006 Commission’s initiative
The standard economic analysis of bilaterals aims to 
estimate their expected net economic gains.7 This ap-
proach has two serious limits. Firstly, it ignores what 
would happen in the rest of the world as a consequence 
of the bilateral examined. For instance, ignoring that the 
preferences granted by a bilateral to its signatories may 
be eroded by new bilaterals, is a severe shortcoming, 
in particular if there is a generalized rush to bilaterals. 
Secondly, the standard economic analysis has notorious 
difficulties to take into account the intrinsic limits of any 
bilateral, in particular the crucial limits imposed to ef-
fective market access by the “rules of origin” adopted by 
the signatories (these rules define the appropriate tariffs 
to be enforced on imports).
A much more interesting approach seems thus to be to 
get a sense of whether the current and envisaged bilat-
erals are looking for “a market opening” or for “market 
preferences”. The former case is valid for bilaterals be-
tween countries applying low tariffs on goods imported 
from countries other than the signatories of the deal 
(the “rest of the world”) and enforcing domestic pro-
competitive regulations on services and investment. 
Such bilaterals are likely to have a net positive effect on 
the signatories, and no significant negative impact on the 
rest of the world―hence, they may be stepping stones to 
world trade liberalization.
In sharp contrast, the “market preferences” case ap-
plies to bilaterals between countries enforcing high tar-
iffs on goods imported from the rest of the world, and 
anti-competitive domestic regulations on services and 
investment. Such bilaterals generate high “preferences” 
to the partners. Such preferences distort trade flows be-
cause they favour the inefficient firms of the EC partners 
at the detriment of the European consumers of highly 
protected European goods and services (they induce 
these European consumers to buy goods and services 
from inefficient partners rather than goods and services 
more efficiently produced in the rest of the world, and 
vice versa for the partners’ consumers). The higher the 
preferences are, the more distorted the bilateral trade 
flows may be, the higher the costs of the bilateral deal 
may be for the consumers of the products and services 
imported from the trading partner (compared to a mul-
tilateral liberalization), the higher the likelihood of the 
collapse of the bilateral agreement would be, and the 
more painful the “erosion” of these preferences would 
be for the signatories. In short, such bilaterals are likely 
to be stumbling stones to world trade opening.
Table 1 follows this approach. It aims at providing 
an―admittedly crude―sense of the “market opening” vs 
“market preference” nature of the 91 bilaterals signed by 
seven countries, and of the 100 bilaterals under nego-
tiation or under consideration by these seven countries. 
These seven countries consist of two “small” economies 
(Chile and Singapore), one medium-size economy (Ko-
rea), and four “large” economies (China, the EC, Japan 
and the US). Column 1 gives the number of the bilater-
als signed or under consideration for each of these coun-
tries.
Columns 2 and 3 give the GDP shares of the seven 
countries’ trading partners in the world GDP (both at 
current and PPP exchange rates). Thus they give a sense 
of the coverage of the market preferences that could be 
created by the size of the partners in the existing and fu-
ture bilaterals of the seven countries in question. Com-
bining the coverage indicator with indicators focusing 
on the level of preferences (that is, the coverage times 
the level) would then give a sense of the magnitude of 
the expected preferences. Columns 2 and 3 show the 
diversity of the situations. The current bilaterals cover a 
very low share of world GDP, except for the two small 
economies, a feature echoing the above-mentioned lead 
of the small economies among the current bilaterals. But 
looking at the bilaterals under negotiation or considera-
tion dramatically changes the picture. The most impor-
tant observation is that the Commission’s proposal gen-
erates such a change of scale in bilateralism that it could 
trigger a race to bilaterals among the large countries, if 
China and/or the US feel compelled to follow a strategy 
as aggressive as the one designed in the EC proposal.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 focus on tariffs, the first key 
instrument that could determine the level of preferences in 
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trade in goods (this is 
why the seven coun-
tries are ranked by 
the increasing level 
of the average tariffs 
applied by their part-
ners in bilaterals). A 
low average in applied 
tariffs suggest bilater-
als more focused on 
market opening than 
on market prefer-
ences (low average 
tariffs imply relative-
ly few peak tariffs). 
By contrast, bilaterals 
behind a high average 
in applied tariffs are 
prone to market pref-
erences. The same 
could be said in case 
of high average bound tariffs (such bilaterals may protect 
partners in bilaterals from tariff increases, at the detri-
ment of the rest of the world). Column 4 shows that the 
EC partners have the highest average of applied tariffs if 
the bilaterals under negotiation or consideration by the 
Commission’s proposal are concluded. Column 5 based 
on bound tariffs suggests again possible substantial mar-
ket preferences for the bilaterals under negotiation or 
consideration by the four largest countries. In sum, the 
bilaterals involving the small economies tend to focus on 
market access, in sharp contrast with the EC bilaterals 
that are dominated by market preferences.
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 1 focus on non-tariff bar-
riers, the other key instrument that could determine 
the level of preferences in trade in goods. As there is 
no direct measure of such barriers, Table 1 relies on the 
ranking of the partners of the seven countries in two 
respects―the ease of trading across borders and the ease 
of dealing with licences, two indicators estimated by 
the Doing Business database.8 Ranks are crude indica-
tors (there may be a much bigger difference between 
the first and second rank than between the second and 
third rank, or vice-versa). However, average ranks in 
columns 6 and 7 exhibit differences among of the seven 
countries’ partners so large that they are likely to be 
meaningful. Once again, the bilaterals under negotiation 
or consideration by the EC appear the more prone to 
market preferences.
Column 8 to 10 of Table 1 look at services and in-
vestments, also with the help of indicators provided by 
the Doing Business database. The services dimension 
is captured by the global indicator of the ease of doing 
business with the various trading partners of the seven 
countries examined, whereas the investment dimension 
is reflected by the ranks in property registering and in 
investors’ protection among trading partners. Once 
again, these indicators roughly show the EC and China 
on the one hand, and on the opposite side the five other 
countries. Once again, the bilaterals under negotiation 
or consideration by the EC appear the more dominated 
by market preferences.
The analysis based on Table 1 deserves a caveat. It as-
sumes that the negotiations of the bilaterals will deliver 
successful outcomes. This assumption is far from being 
granted to bilaterals involving “not-so-small” partners, 
such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia. In this case, 
there are good reasons to expect a failure of the negotia-
tions, or a very limited content of the deal.9 This is all 
the more plausible since none of these four partners are 
especially known for being an easy partner to negotiate 
with. Indeed, it remains to be seen why the EC would 
get market access in a bilateral setting when it could not 
get such a result in the WTO forum by forging an alli-
ance with other countries.
Table 1
Bilaterals: Seven Countries, Two Strategies
Table 1: Bilaterals:  Seven Countries, Two Strategies
Number
of at at trading dealing ease of regis- protec-
partners current PPP applied bound across with doing tering ting
USD USD borders licences business property investors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A.  Bilaterals signed
Singapore 10 48.5 39.3 4.8 9.2 35.8 41.7 28.0 35.3 16.7
Chile 20 79.0 70.4 5.5 8.0 34.1 70.8 41.5 39.6 46.3
Korea 14 4.1 5.8 7.1 21.5 58.8 70.3 69.0 59.2 68.7
USA 15 7.6 6.5 7.5 19.6 42.9 41.9 29.2 50.1 34.0
China 14 2.9 5.9 8.0 25.4 63.1 77.3 72.8 66.7 55.4
EC 14 [d] 6.4 8.2 9.2 18.3 76.8 91.9 67.1 80.4 53.4
Japan 4 2.7 3.3 10.0 27.4 69.4 62.4 55.6 76.6 52.4
B.  Bilaterals under negotiations or consideration
Singapore 12 90.6 81.2 5.7 9.0 40.0 68.9 43.5 42.3 41.0
Chile 9 [e] 81.6 77.7 6.4 10.3 43.2 77.8 49.4 45.5 45.1
Korea 11 49.1 57.4 7.3 13.3 43.3 85.3 57.6 39.8 40.4
Japan 18 13.4 16.4 7.5 20.0 53.5 58.3 54.8 60.6 56.6
USA 14 14.9 16.5 8.8 21.3 54.1 69.7 52.2 64.7 44.2
China 12 10.4 17.0 10.1 25.5 83.1 96.4 83.5 76.1 47.2
EC 24 23.4 44.2 10.3 17.8 71.1 125.6 91.2 61.8 64.8
[a] GDP (in USD, 2004) as a share of world GDP.  [b] WTO Trade Profiles. [c] Doing Business 2007.
[d] Counting as one the 10 countries having acceded to the EC in 2004.   [e] Counting as one the EC.
Market size [a] Average industrial Regulatory ranking [c]
tariff [b]
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Danger Ahead: the “Spaghetti Bowl” Turning into 
an “Electron Collider”
To conclude, bilaterals under negotiation or consid-
eration by the recent Commission’s proposal seem to 
be seriously biased towards substantial market prefer-
ences, creating serious systemic risks in the world trade 
regime. In particular, they magnify the risk that the ag-
gressive approach of the Commission might trigger a 
race to bilaterals, by inducing the US, China and Japan 
to “catch up” in terms of bilaterals. The intent shown by 
President Bush “to negotiate more free trade deals”10 and the 
signature of the Korea-US trade agreement may be the 
first signs of this new turn.11
The November 2006 Commission’s proposal is 
all the more strange because the EC is the only large 
WTO Member to have already experienced the nega-
tive shocks associated with the existence of many bilat-
erals. In the 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
the EC signed new bilaterals with the Central European 
economies, breaking up the ranking of preferences that 
it had established in the 1960s-1980s among its many 
partners in bilaterals (most of them being developing or 
least developed countries). The political strains of this 
development were so onerous for the EC that, in 1997, 
it decided a “pause” in its policy on bilaterals. It aban-
doned plans of making new bilaterals, and decided to 
merely conclude the already ongoing negotiations –suc-
cessfully so in the case of Chile and Mexico, but failing 
to do so with the Mercosur countries.
In short, the EC history sends a clear signal―the dan-
ger of the “spaghetti bowl”12 turning into an “electron 
collider” where there are so many bilaterals that they 
clash against each other.
2. Back to the Doha Round: the Two 
Core Criteria Defining Success
Sections 3 and 4 investigate the possibility of bolder 
EC initiatives in the Doha Round, as well as in indus-
try and agriculture. These initiatives should be consist-
ent with the following two core criteria defined by the 
Doha negotiators.
The first criterion is embodied in paragraph 16 of 
the 2001 Doha Declaration that states: “The negotiations 
shall take fully into account the special needs and interests of 
developing and least-developed country participants, includ-
ing through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments 
[...]”. The “less than full reciprocity” condition does not 
make much economic sense (in fact, it may be harm-
ful to the countries it is supposed to help, that is, the 
developing countries). But the negotiators seem to have 
lost all capacity to put it aside, the developing countries 
being adamant on this condition, which they see as the 
minimum expression of the “development” dimension 
of the Doha Round. As the criterion imposes some dif-
ference between the post-Doha level of liberalization in 
advanced economies and the corresponding level in de-
veloping countries, the challenge faced by the negotia-
tors is to determine the magnitude of such a difference 
that could be acceptable to the key WTO Members and 
that would be the least harmful to the emerging and de-
veloping countries.
The second criterion is embodied in paragraph 24 of 
the 2005 Hong Kong Declaration that states: “[...] we in-
struct our negotiators to ensure that there is a comparably high 
level of ambition in market access for Agriculture and NAMA.” 
This statement is expressed in terms of goods (contrary 
to the previous one) but it also has a country dimension 
since it requires de facto some “parallelism” between the 
liberalization of the industrial markets of the emerging 
countries and the liberalization of the advanced econo-
mies’ agricultural markets. This second criterion is eco-
nomically neutral. It will be sound if it fuels a virtuous 
circle of substantial liberalizations by the two groups of 
countries. It will be harmful if it pushes both groups of 
countries into a vicious circle of limiting the liberaliza-
tion scope and/or magnitude.
3. Assessing the Negotiations in 
 Industry from the EC Perspective13
Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) issues 
cover all the industrial sectors, except the food indus-
tries, which are examined in the section devoted to the 
negotiations in “agriculture”. The current balance in the 
negotiations between liberalization and exceptions is as 
follows.
The December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial made 
a giant step in improving the negotiating process in 
NAMA by adopting the “Swiss formula” as the base in-
strument for negotiating tariff cuts.14 The Swiss formula 
is an extremely efficient instrument from a negotiating 
point of view (it is as far as possible the simplest negoti-
ating method, since it involves an agreement on one fig-
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ure only, namely the Swiss coefficient), from an economic 
perspective (it cuts high tariffs more than small tariffs, 
hence it captures most of the welfare gains to be expect-
ed from liberalization, while the possibility to stabilize 
or even increase tariff revenues is kept open), and from 
a domestic political point of view (it keeps the pre-lib-
eralization ranking of tariffs unchanged, so it does not 
trigger fights among domestic vested interests).
At the same time, the Hong Kong Ministerial has 
opened the door for exceptions to the use of the Swiss 
formula―though only for developing countries. The need 
for exceptions to a base formula is an unavoidable com-
ponent of negotiations in a forum with so many and so 
diverse Members as the WTO.15 But, the Hong Kong 
Ministerial was unable to define the exceptions more 
clearly than the 2004 Framework Agreement. This fail-
ure has amounted to void the Swiss formula of any sub-
stance―not only because the coverage of the exceptions 
has been left open, but also because the magnitude of 
the exceptions can be huge.
Why is an attractive trade-off between the base Swiss 
formula and predictable exceptions an outcome so diffi-
cult to find in the Doha Round? During the two last dec-
ades, many developing countries have cut their applied 
tariffs (unilaterally or in accordance with their Uruguay 
Round commitments) without binding their tariffs at 
their new, applied levels. (Under WTO rules, bound 
tariffs are the only ones that cannot be raised without 
compensating the affected trading partners, by so doing 
delivering legal certainty in market access.) The fact that 
a large number of WTO Members exhibit huge “tariff 
water” (the difference between bound and applied tar-
iffs) makes the Doha Round very special. 16 It implies 
that, even if they do not lead to cuts in applied tariffs, 
cuts in bound tariffs have, more than in any previous 
Round, a huge intrinsic economic value that negotia-
tors tend to undervalue―while the business community 
is heavily insisting upon it.
The European Goal in NAMA: Listen to the 
 European Business Community
It is often said that trade negotiators suffer from a lack 
of support from their business community. This has not 
been the case for the EC negotiators in NAMA. Eu-
ropean firms have, clearly and repeatedly, defined the 
concessions they expect in NAMA from the emerging 
economies, namely “no single [industrial] tariff above 15 
percent at the end of the implementation period of the Doha 
Round (except for LDCs)”.17
Such a target is economically sound for three rea-
sons―clearly showing that it should be adopted by the 
EC negotiators. Firstly, its key virtue is to eliminate the 
tariff peaks that are the most detrimental to European 
exports, and that generate the bulk of the welfare costs 
imposed on the domestic consumers of the emerging 
economies. Secondly, this target would vastly increase 
the certainty of access to the emerging countries’ mar-
kets for the European exporters―an outcome that is 
highly valued by the business community. Lastly, this tar-
get is far from imposing a brutal trade liberalization on 
the emerging countries (as shown by the current level 
of the average applied tariffs, see column 3 of Annex 
Table 2) a feature that should help to reduce requests for 
exceptions, and to make them as simple and predictable 
as possible (see below).
The Base Swiss Coefficient for the Emerging 
Countries
Table 2 shows that the highest Swiss coefficients that 
would still fulfil the European business target would 
range from a Swiss20 to a Swiss25. It focuses on nine 
emerging economies, which represent 30 percent of the 
world GDP and can be split in three groups. Group I 
countries can offer notable liberalization opportunities, 
but in doing so they should take care to keep tariff water 
at their current low level.18 Group II countries can also 
offer notable tariff cuts, but, above all, they should offer 
their trading partners substantially more certainty by 
cutting their high bound tariffs. Lastly, Group III coun-
tries can offer both substantial tariff cuts and certainty 
(binding).
The Swiss25 is the base Swiss coefficient chosen in 
this paper for three reasons. Firstly, almost all the post-
Doha tariffs still above 15 percent with a Swiss25 are 
smaller than 16 percent (Indonesia) or 17 percent (In-
dia)―which indicates that the Swiss25 is a very limited 
departure from the European business target. Secondly, 
the choice of a Swiss25 aims at changing the negotiat-
ing dynamics by promoting the notion that a more “gen-
erous” base Swiss coefficient should be “paid” by less 
numerous and/or complex exceptions. For instance, 
adopting a Swiss25 (rather than a Swiss22 or 23 which 
would completely eliminate tariffs higher than 15 per-
cent) should be compensated by a more compromising 
attitude on exceptions from the EC trading partners. 
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Lastly – and crucially in the Doha context―the choice 
of a Swiss25 would make the fulfilment of the “less than 
full reciprocity in reduction commitments” condition easier, 
as shown above.
In sharp contrast to this approach, some EC Mem-
ber states have insisted on the use of a Swiss15 for the 
emerging economies. But, a Swiss15 would clearly go 
beyond the European business target, since it would 
generate maximum tariffs in the emerging countries of 
roughly 13 percent. Such an “overshooting” has pushed 
the emerging countries’ negotiators to look for wide 
and far-reaching exceptions in NAMA, offering to the 
EC and about ten other industrial countries the excuse 
to do the same in farm and food products―ultimately a 
self-defeating sequence for every WTO Member.
Predictable Exceptions for the Emerging  
Economies
Exceptions should be defined in such a way that ne-
gotiators could easily predict their impact on the final 
balance of concessions between their own country and 
its trading partners. In NAMA, simplicity suggests the 
use of Swiss coefficient(s) for exceptions higher than 
the base one. A 50 percent bound tariff seems to be the 
reasonably highest post-Doha tariff, since there are only 
two dozen applied tariffs higher than 50 percent in the 
nine emerging economies. As a result, a Swiss60 would 
be the highest Swiss coefficient, since it cuts a 300 per-
cent tariff (the highest existing bound tariff for the 18 
countries) into a 50 percent bound tariff. Moreover, 
the following calculations assume that 2 percent of the 
tariff lines could be eligible for a Swiss60, and that an 
additional 4 percent of the tariff lines could be eligible 
for a Swiss40 (an arbitrarily chosen intermediate figure 
between a Swiss25 and a Swiss60).
Based on this “combined Swiss formula”, Table 2 shows 
that the emerging countries would exhibit average 
bound tariffs ranging from 6.7 to 14.7 percent, with a 
maximum bound tariff of 50 percent, but with very few 
tariffs higher than 30 percent.19 Moreover, the fact that 
the number of tariff lines with a tariff higher than 15 
percent does not increase notably (compared to those 
in the case of a Swiss25 alone, see Table 2) suggests that 
the combined Swiss coefficient is an interesting compro-
mise between the exceptions to be introduced and the 
liberalization targeted by the European business com-
munity.
Table 3 summarizes the changes in protection gen-
erated by such a combined Swiss formula. Firstly, the 
average bound tariff would be cut by 4 to 22 percentage 
points (column 1), and the maximum bound tariffs by 
15 to 250 percentage points (column 2). Secondly, cuts 
in bound tariffs would have an impact on the applied 
tariffs. This is clearly the case for the maximum applied 
tariffs that would be cut by 8 to 165 percentage points 
(column 4). Once again, this is an important result be-
Table 2. Calculations of possible tariff cuts, selected emerging countries
Average Maximum Average Maximum Average Maximum
bound Number Average bound bound Number Average bound bound Number Average bound
tariff of lines tariff tariff tariff of lines tariff tariff tariff of lines tariff tariff
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
I. Moderate bound and applied tariffs, low tariff water:  offering notable liberalization while keeping certainty high
Korea 6,0 0 0,0 13,0 6,5 0 0,0 14,9 6,7 190 18,8 22,1
South Africa 5,2 0 0,0 15,0 5,8 230 16,5 17,6 6,2 266 23,1 30,0
Malaysia 5,4 8 17,7 18,8 6,0 25 18,0 23,1 6,2 118 21,6 50,0
II. High bound tariffs, moderate applied tariffs and tariff water: offering notable liberalization while offering more certainty
Philippines 8,1 0 0,0 14,3 9,0 159 16,4 16,7 9,3 384 17,7 27,3
Thailand 9,2 17 16,0 16,0 10,3 41 17,3 19,0 10,6 211 20,0 34,3
III. High bound tariffs, moderate applied tariffs, high tariff water: offering substantial liberalization and more certainty
Brazil 11,6 1 16,2 16,2 13,2 1 19,3 19,3 13,4 201 20,1 22,1
Mexico 12,7 0 0,0 14,3 12,6 82 16,1 16,7 14,7 206 20,2 27,3
Indonesia 12,2 20 17,1 17,2 14,1 2692 15,4 20,8 14,4 2701 15,9 34,3
India 12,4 10 17,2 17,6 14,3 2571 15,8 21,4 14,7 2571 16,5 42,0
Notes [a] Based on a Swiss factor of 25 combined with a Swiss of 40 for 4 percent of the tariff lines and a factor of 60 for 2
percent of the tariff lines.  The two highest Swiss factors have been systematically applied to the currently highest
applied tariffs.
Source Forbes et al  2004.  Author's computations.
Swiss factor = 20 Swiss factor = 25 Combined Swiss factor [a]
Tariffs  >15% Tariffs  >15% Tariffs  >15%
Table 2
Calculations of possible tariff cuts, selected emerging countries
Source: Forbes et al 2004. Author’s computations.
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cause it is a crucial source of welfare gains. Lastly, ef-
fective cuts in terms of average tariffs may be limited to 
three countries (column 3) but the average tariff water 
would be eliminated or reduced to a low level in all the 
other countries―a result of considerable importance for, 
and highly valued by, the business community.
The Base Swiss Coefficient for the Advanced 
Economies and the Two Core Doha Criteria
The potential offer from the advanced economies 
is mostly limited to cuts in peak tariffs, and to cuts in 
bound tariffs for Australia and New Zealand. These cuts 
have a huge economic value for the emerging economies 
because industrial economies’ tariffs peaks are concen-
trated on the major exports of the developing countries. 
But, negotiators do not capture this economic value be-
cause they often measure the “negotiating value” of con-
cessions by weighting the negotiated tariff cuts by the 
existing imports.
Would a Swiss10 deliver enough tariff cuts from 
the advanced economies for them to be considered as 
complying with the “less than full reciprocity” criterion? 
Or should it be a Swiss coefficient lower than 10? It 
should be stressed that a Swiss coefficient, lower than 
10, has a questionable economic value for the emerg-
ing economies. For instance, shifting from a Swiss10 to 
a Swiss5 would reduce the average bound tariffs of the 
industrial economies from a range of 1.4-4.4 percent 
to a range of 1.0-2.8 percent, and it would reduce the 
maximum bound tariffs from a range of 5.0-8.6 percent 
to a range of 3.3-4.6 percent. From the emerging econ-
omies’ point of view, gains from such limited cuts of 
so low tariffs are not very attractive―especially if, once 
enforced, they trigger more antidumping or safeguard 
actions from the advanced economies against exports 
from the emerging economies.
An economically sound alternative for the emerging 
economies may thus be a deal based on a Swiss25 for 
the emerging countries and a Swiss10 for the advanced 
economies―reflecting the basic fact that the advanced 
economies have liberalized much more and earlier than 
the emerging countries, and the decision of the Doha 
negotiators not to allow exceptions on tariff cuts for 
the advanced economies. Clearly, this tentative conclu-
sion depends very much upon the concessions of the 
advanced economies in the negotiations in agriculture. 
The deeper the concessions in agriculture from the ad-
vanced economies, the more a Swiss25-Swiss10 deal in 
NAMA would be acceptable to the emerging econo-
mies―indeed, the more the “comparably high level of ambi-
tion in market access for Agriculture and NAMA” criterion 
would be met.
4. Assessing the Negotiations 
in  “Agriculture” from the EC 
 Perspective20
At the first glance, the “comparably high level of ambi-
tion” criterion seems to be a target out of reach, since 
trade liberalization in farm products is so much lagging 
behind liberalization in NAMA products. However, this 
first impression disappears when one recognizes the crit-
ical fact that talking about negotiations in “agriculture” 
is a misnomer. The current negotiations deal with many 
more agro-industrial (hereafter “food”) goods (roughly 
1,500 tariff lines) than with farm products (roughly 500 
tariff lines). This little recognized feature is crucial be-
cause trade liberalization in food products is, by nature, 
close to trade liberalization in industrial products, and 
can thus benefit from the long experience in the latter. 
Making a clear distinction between these two very dif-
ferent types of products thus opens a window of oppor-
tunities in the Doha negotiations in “agriculture.”
Table 3. Summary of tariff cuts generated by a "combined
Swiss formula", selected emerging countries
average maximum
[a] [b] avg [c] max [d]
1 2 3 4
III. Offering some liberalization, keeping certainty high
Korea -3,5 -14,7 0,0 -7,9
South Africa -4,8 -30,0 -1,6 -24,5
Malaysia -5,0 -250,0 -1,8 -165,6
China n.a. -22,7 n.a. -22,7
IV. Offering some liberalization and more certainty
Philippines -7,4 -22,7 3,5 -12,7
Thailand -9,6 -45,7 0,6 -45,7
V. Offering more liberalization and more certainty
Brazil -16,0 -62,9 0,7 -12,9
Mexico -20,1 -22,7 1,3 -22,7
Indonesia -20,6 -90,7 7,6 -45,7
India -22,3 -108,0 -0,7 -10,0
Notes:
[a] (post-Doha avg bound tariffs) minus (current avg bound tariffs).
[b] (post-Doha max bound tariffs) minus (current max bound tariffs).
[c] (post-Doha avg bound tariffs) minus (current avg applied tariffs).
[d] (post-Doha max bound tariffs) minus (current max applied tariffs).
Sources: Forbes et al  2004, Table 2.
(percentage points)
Cuts in bound tariffs
(percentage points)
Applied tariff cuts due
to bound tariff cuts
Table 3 
Summary of tariff cuts generated by a 
“ combined Swiss formula”, selected 
emerging countries
Source: Forbes et al 2004, Table 2.
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The negotiators in farm and food products face a 
problem that does not exist in NAMA. The formulas, 
which, so far, have been tabled for cutting tariffs on farm 
and food products are much murkier than the Swiss for-
mula adopted in NAMA. The negotiators have agreed to 
work on complex “tiered” formulas―they are 16 times 
more complex than a Swiss formula, since, as shown by 
Table 4, striking a deal requires no less than 16 decisions 
(three thresholds defining four tariff ranges, four per-
centage cuts for each range, and a tariff cap).21
Thus assessing the economic and political impact of 
the tiered formulas appears essential. Paragraph 24 and 
common sense both suggest that a Swiss-like approach 
would be a useful benchmark for such a task since the 
“comparably high level of ambition” condition would be 
much easier to check if the same instrument is used for 
cutting tariffs in agriculture and in manufacturing. Figure 
1 illustrates the EC tiered offer and two Swiss formulas, 
one with a coefficient of 60 and another with a coeffi-
cient of 70 for reasons explained below. The horizontal 
axis gives the current EC tariffs. The data used are very 
close to those used by the EC negotiators (since they 
include the ad valorem equivalents, as estimated by the 
Commission, of the many EC specific tariffs). The verti-
cal axis illustrates the post-Doha tariffs, which would 
be obtained by using the alternative formulas. The EC 
tiered proposal is illustrated by the four straight lines, 
the Swiss60 coefficient by the lower and long curve line, 
and the Swiss70 coefficient by the higher and shorter 
curve line.
European Farmers Are Not the Main 
 Beneficiaries of the EC Proposal
Figure 1 provides a crucial result for the EC domestic 
policy makers (for the sake of clarity, Figure 1 ignores 
the one EC tariff higher than 250 percent). A Swiss-like 
approach would impose deeper tariff cuts on the current 
(pre-Doha) highest tariffs than the EC tiered formula, 
and smaller tariff cuts on the currently less protected 
products than the EC tiered formula. For instance, the 
Swiss60 would cut an initial tariff of 90 percent into a 
post-Doha tariff of 36 percent (compared to 45 percent 
in case of the tiered formula) and it would cut an initial 
tariff of 25 percent into a post-Doha tariff of 17.6 per-
cent (compared to 16.3 percent if the tiered formula is 
used).
A Swiss-like approach would thus rebalance the exist-
ing EC offer in an economically sound way, because cut-
ting deeper into the highest tariffs would generate most 
of the welfare gains that European consumers―especially 
the poorest―would expect from a liberalization. But, its 
most surprising result is that it would also have a posi-
tive impact on domestic politics. European producers of 
the goods getting smaller tariff cuts would clearly sup-
port a shift to a Swiss-like approach, while those associ-
ated to deeper tariff cuts would fight against it.
Thus the key question is: Which producers would 
benefit from such a rebalance? Using a table of concord-
ance between every tariff line and the level of  processing 
Table 4. Tabled proposals on farm tariff cuts, 2005
definition tariff cut definition tariff cut definition tariff cut
of the tiers (%) (%) (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developed countries
highest tier >90% 60 >75% 75 >60% 85-90
medium high 60-90% 50 50-75% 65 40-60% 75-85
medium low 30-60% 45 20-50% 55 20-40% 65-75
lowest tier 0-30% 35 0-20% 45 0-20% 55-65
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developing countries
highest band >130% 40 >130% 40 >60% [a]
medium high 80-130% 35 80-130% 35 40-60% [a]
medium low 30-80% 30 30-80% 30 20-40% [a]
lowest band 0-30% 25 <30% 25 0-20% [a]
Other elements of tariff rates
cap tariff (developed countries) -- 100 -- 100 -- 75
cap tariff (developing countries) -- 150 -- 150 -- 100
Sources: The EC, G20 and US proposals.  Note [a]: Reference to "slightly lesser reductions" without more precision.
EC proposal US proposalG20 proposal
Table 4
Tabled propasals on farm tariff cuts, 2005
Source: The EC, G20 and US proposals. Note [a]: Reference to “slightly lesser reductions” without more precision.
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in farm and food prod-
ucts suggests several 
results summarized in 
Table 5.22
Firstly, Table 5 shows 
the strong “tariff esca-
lation” among the ini-
tial EC tariffs―the more 
processed the goods, 
the higher their level of 
protection. The average 
tariff of the bulk farm 
products (19.7 percent) 
is substantially lower 
than the average tariff 
of the processed food 
products (32.3 percent), 
and, even more striking-
ly, the highest tariff for 
the farm products (93.6 
percent) is much smaller 
than the highest tariff on 
processed food (264.3 
percent).
Secondly, the tariff 
cuts proposed by the 
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Table 5. Rebalancing the EC tariff proposal
C urrent
ad val. P ost-Doha tariffs  (%)
equivalent
tariffs E C S wiss S wiss S wiss
% offer 70 60 50
All "agricultural" products  (2011 tariff lines)
average tariffs 24.4 12.9 13.9 13.1 12.2
B ulk farm commodities  (117 tariff lines)
average tariffs 19.7 10.7 11.8 11.1 10.3
maximum tariff 93.6 43.7 40.0 36.6 32.6
number of tariff lines  with smaller cuts  [b] 65 60 42
number of tariff lines  with larger cuts  [b] 8 13 31
P roduces/horticulture products  (273 tariff lines)
average tariffs 13.6 8.0 9.7 9.3 8.9
maximum tariff 118.9 47.6 44.1 39.9 35.2
number of tariff lines  with smaller cuts  [b] 214 210 202
number of tariff lines  with larger cuts  [b] 5 9 17
S emiprocessed products  (488 tariff lines)
average tariffs 12.6 6.8 7.6 7.2 6.7
maximum tariff 174.9 70.0 50.0 44.7 38.9
number of tariff lines  with smaller cuts  [b] 262 243 226
number of tariff lines  with larger cuts  [b] 24 43 60
P rocessed products  (1120 tariff lines)
average tariffs 32.3 16.9 17.8 16.7 15.5
maximum tariff 264.3 105.7 55.3 48.9 42.0
number of tariff lines  with smaller cuts  [b] 949 847 749
number of tariff lines  with larger cuts  [b] 118 222 318
Notes [a] it was impossible to allocate ** tariff lines in the three categories of products.
[b] in case of using a Swiss formula instead of the EC tier-based formula.
Source EC tariff offer in agriculture. Author's computation.
Figure 1
Assessing the EC tier-based formula for tariff cuts
Table 5
Rebalancing the EC tariff proposal






 current EC proposal protect food producers much more 
often than farmers. Table 5 shows that the post-Doha tar-
iffs would be 10.7 percent for the bulk farm commodi-
ties compared to 16.9 percent for processed food prod-
ucts, while the post-Doha tariff peaks would be 43.7 
percent for those farm products, compared to 105.7 
percent for processed food. Interestingly, the food prod-
ucts that would remain the EC’s most protected items 
after the Doha Round are a strange hodgepodge of waste 
products (dog and cat food, offal, whey, etc) goods with 
a tiny potential in international trade (yoghurts) and 
products of questionable importance (cucumbers, gher-
kins, etc).
Thirdly, protecting farmers does not require a pro-
tection of food producers. Farmers are, to a notable 
extent, immune to changes in the composition of the 
various processed food products, which can be derived 
from their farm production. For instance, milk can be 
used to produce butter, cheese, yoghurts, sweets, etc, in 
the same way as coal can be used for producing energy, 
steel or chemicals. If some processed dairy products are 
highly protected, it is above all at the detriment of the 
less protected processed dairy products. Re-balancing 
protection among food products would mostly generate 
a re-allocation of the farm production among its various 
possible uses in the food industry. This point is examined 
in more detail below.
Lastly, tariff escalation is no longer necessary for 
“immunizing” European food producers against the high 
protection granted to European farm products. This ar-
gument is largely obsolete because, today, farm products 
represent a small share of the total costs of the final food 
products (often within the range of 10-15 percent of the 
prices paid by the consumers) so that less protection of 
the food products (relative to the protection granted to 
the farm products) is unlikely to have a notable impact 
on the competitiveness of the food producers.
Re-balancing Tariff Cuts
That said, a better EC tariff offer should meet two 
conditions. It should be ambitious enough to fulfil the 
“comparably high level of ambition” criterion imposed by 
the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial. And, it should attract 
domestic European political support – it should be seen 
as a better deal than the current EC offer by a vast ma-
jority of the farmers and food producers. The following 
outline shows that it is possible.23
Table 5 suggests that a base Swiss coefficient of 60 
(or its tiered equivalent) would be a substantial im-
provement over the EC current offer.24 Firstly, it would 
generate an average EC tariff in farm and food products 
of roughly 13 percent―a tariff level similar to the average 
tariff in NAMA products of some large emerging econo-
mies (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico) and not far away 
from the average tariff of China, the Philippines and 
Thailand. In other words, it would meet the “compara-
bly high level of ambition” criterion. One could argue that 
the EC tiered proposal does the same. But, the Swiss60 
would meet the “comparably high level of ambition” crite-
rion in another crucial respect―and that is not the case 
of the EC tiered proposal. The Swiss60 would generate 
a maximum EC tariff on farm and food products very 
close to 50 percent, precisely the maximum tariff tar-
geted in NAMA for the emerging economies.
Secondly, a Swiss60 would generate a notable re-bal-
ancing: 287 tariff lines would have larger tariff cuts than 
those currently proposed, and 1 360 tariff lines would 
have smaller tariff cuts than those currently tabled (364 
lines would see no change). More crucially, the addi-
tional cuts would occur almost exclusively (in 92 per-
cent of the cases) in the food sector.
In other words, re-balancing would clearly improve 
the situation of a vast majority of the farmers compared 
to their situation under the tiered proposal. Table 5 
shows the very few bulk and horticulture products that 
would be concerned with additional cuts, and the many 
products that would benefit from tariff cuts smaller than 
those imposed by the tiered formula.
Although tariffs with larger cuts are concentrated 
in the processed food sector, rebalancing would keep 
the average tariff of all the processed food products al-
most unchanged. But it would cut 222 food tariffs more 
deeply―on average from 45.5 to 35 percent, but by more 
than 5 percent for only 87 tariffs, and by more than 10 
percent for only 46 tariffs (a dozen of which are various 
forms of whey). Meanwhile, it would cut 847 food tar-
iffs less deeply (on average from 11.4 to 13.1 percent). 
A vast majority in the processed sector would thus gain 
from rebalancing, all the more if the food markets in the 
rest of the world would also be opened up.
However, it is important to check in more detail the 
case of the “sensitive” products for which food tariffs are 
often said to have an impact on farm products. In the 
case of poultry, lamb and beef, very few lines would face 
notably larger tariff cuts with a Swiss60, compared to a 
tiered formula. Only 2 (out of 100), 3 (out of 30), and 
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4 (out of 56) tariff lines (respectively) would face ad-
ditional tariff cuts larger than 5 percentage points – a 
proportion so small that one would not expect serious 
problems for the farmers involved. In the case of dairy 
products, 40 tariff lines (out of 170) would face addi-
tional tariff cuts larger than 5 percentage points, and 
two dozen tariff lines would see additional cuts larger 
than 10 percentage points (half of them being whey). 
In the case of sugar, half a dozen tariff lines (out of 34) 
would face additional tariff cuts larger than 5 percent-
age points. In short, shifting to a Swiss60 could raise 
problems for less than 50 tariff lines. Moreover, as un-
derlined above, many of the dairy products pertaining 
to this small group of products exhibit wide differences 
in post-Doha tariffs (under a tiered formula) which are 
totally or largely unrelated to farm coefficients―for in-
stance, a different packaging size or different but close 
varieties. In such cases, it is very unlikely that, with a 
Swiss60, the narrower range of post-Doha tariffs would 
have a notable impact on the farmers involved.
Bearing this in mind, and in consideration of the 
NAMA negotiations, there is a need to define predict-
able exceptions for farm and food products. Currently, 
the Doha negotiators are considering an intensive use 
of “tariff-rate quotas” as the preferred instrument for 
exceptions. However, when doing so, negotiators often 
misinterpret the basic nature of a tariff-rate quota―hence 
the commitments that this instrument generates. When 
negotiated, a tariff-rate quota locks together three com-
mitments: the “out-of-quota” tariff (to be imposed on 
the quantities imported above a given quota) the “in 
quota” tariff (to be imposed on the quantities imported 
within the quota) and the quota (which defines the tariff 
to be applied). Hence, liberalizing an existing tariff-rate 
quota is a three-dimensional operation: cutting the out-
of-quota tariff, cutting the in-quota tariff, and increasing 
the quota. In short, it does not consist in simply cutting 
the out-of-quota tariff.25
This observation is crucial for analysing the current 
EC proposal dealing with the so-called “sensitive” prod-
ucts. The European Commission is suggesting an in-
crease in the quotas of these products as a compensation 
for reducing their out-of-quota tariffs by less than (by 
half) the cut of the out-of-quota tariffs required by the 
EC tiered formula. This proposal has two flaws. Firstly, 
it does not include an offer on the level of liberalization 
of the two other components of the initial commitment 
(that is, the cut of the in-quota tariff and the increase of 
the quota) nor a compensation for the absence of such 
offers. Secondly, the increases in the in-quota quantity 
proposed by the Commission seem to rely on unitary 
elasticities (more accurate elasticities are within the 
range of 3 to 6 for most of the products concerned).
In a broader perspective, it is clear that a tariff-rate 
quota-based approach is self-defeating from the EC 
farmers’ perspective. If the European demand becomes 
smaller than the quota, the EC price will reflect the 
low in-quota tariff, and the EC producers would then 
be (much) more strongly exposed to freer trade than 
expected by the negotiators. If the European demand 
exceeds the quota, the EC price will be determined by 
the world price plus the high out-of-quota tariff, gener-
ating huge rents for the quota beneficiaries. Who would 
get these rents? The answer depends on several param-
eters, but there is a sure bet: it would not be the Euro-
pean farmers―but rather EC-based importing firms or 
foreign exporting firms (this second alternative raising 
the question whether these rents will go to the most ef-
ficient exporters, or not).
Thus there are good reasons for the EC farmers to 
avoid the trap of the tariff-rate quotas. As suggested above 
for the NAMA negotiations, the best solution may be 
the simplest one, which is (a) higher Swiss coefficient(s). 
Table 5 investigates this possibility with a Swiss70 (or its 
tiered equivalent) on the farm bulk commodities. First-
ly, a Swiss70 would attract farmers’ support because 
it would increase the average tariff on farm products 
to 11.8 percent, compared to 10.7 percent under the 
current offer, and it would reduce only 8 farm tariffs 
(with larger tariff cuts limited to 4.8 percent at most). 
Secondly, using a Swiss70 only for the bulk commodi-
ties amounts to making exceptions for only 5 percent of 
the total tariff lines in farm and food products, a figure 
close to the scope of exceptions in NAMA, hence meet-
ing the “comparably high level of ambition” criterion. Lastly, 
this criterion would still be met if a few additional tariff 
lines―such as some of the above-mentioned 50 tariff lines 
in the food sector―were shifted under a Swiss70.26
Balancing Tariff Cuts and Domestic Support Cuts
Table 6 shows that the estimated amounts of domestic 
support granted in 2004 are much below the Uruguay 
Round final bound commitments for both the US and 
the EC. In other words, there is a huge “subsidy water” 
in the domestic support of these two countries (which 
echoes the huge tariff water observed in NAMA for 
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the emerging economies). Table 6 suggests a somewhat 
easier negotiating position for the EC than for the US, 
because the EC has already introduced “decoupled” sub-
sidies (it has moved roughly 25 billions euros out of the 
perimeter of the “overall trade distorting support”). By 
contrast, the US is still granting subsidies, which are re-
sponsive to world prices, hence eligible to the Amber 
Box. As of February 2007, the US position in the com-
ing months remains hard to decipher since the legisla-
tive process for a new Farm Bill has just started.
However, the large amount of the EC post-Doha 
domestic support means that serious problems remain. 
Firstly, half of the EC AMS support is generated by the 
EC market price support scheme, the status of which 
critically depends on whether (and to which extent) the 
Doha negotiators will narrow the scope of allowable 
support. Secondly, there is a growing recognition in Eu-
rope that farm subsidies (including direct payments) go 
mostly to large farmers for which few Europeans want 
to fight. In this context, it should be stressed that the 
Europeans (including the French) are, on average, more 
favourable to serious cuts in farm subsidies than Ameri-
cans,27 and that some European farmers are beginning 
to distance themselves from the existing Common Ag-
ricultural Policy (CAP). Lastly, decoupled subsidies will 
undoubtedly face an increasing legitimacy problem. 
As time goes by, it will be increasingly po-
litically unsustainable to grant subsidies to 
farmers on the basis of productions they 
managed in an increasingly far away past.
These EC problems (which would also 
emerge in the US once decoupled subsi-
dies had been introduced) should induce 
the Doha negotiators to start to introduce 
disciplines, which would increasingly limit 
farm subsidies more or less to adjustment 
purposes (and “non-trade concerns”). This 
is a long-term goal, but it requires some 
immediate decisions, namely a stricter defi-
nition of the current “Boxes” in order to 
limit the at the moment wide open possi-
bility that cuts in domestic support could 
be merely “box-shifting”. In this respect, it 
should be stressed that the 2003 CAP re-
form has decoupled EC subsidies without 
bringing any new notable liberalization of 
the European farm sector, as best illustrated 
by the fact that the European overall level of 
protection merely decreased from 57 to 55 percent, all 
other things being constant.28
In such a context, it is crucial to evoke the worri-
some boom in subsidies granted to biofuel production in 
key industrial countries―precisely when the recent cut in 
the EC base sugar price has just revealed to efficient Eu-
ropean sugar growers to what extent the CAP was their 
foe. By keeping alive inefficient European sugar grow-
ers (who are now turning to alternative crops) the CAP 
has made it impossible for the most efficient European 
sugar growers (such as those in France or Britain) to en-
ter profitable markets (such as the Italian sugar market). 
Biofuel subsidies will simply push these efficient sugar 
growers further away from what they should do first―be 
an efficient source of farm products for food―at the risk 
of letting them down when new sources of energy will 
emerge (or if the oil price declines further). The Doha 
negotiators should thus start to make the production of 
(allegedly) clean energy difficult as an excuse for giving 
subsidies to clearly inefficient productions (such as the 
first generation of biofuels).
Would the Failure of the Doha Round  
Save the CAP?
Some European quarters are hoping to save the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) by letting the Doha 
Table 6.  Domestic support in the EC and the US (billion US dollars)
U.S. EC25
1.  The Amber Box (the most trade-distorting subsidies)
The Uruguay final bound commitments 19,1 89,0
Effective amounts in 2004 13,0 42,0
Estimated amounts in 2006-2010 [a] 26,0
The Doha final bound commitments: proposals based
on the EC formula 7,6 26,7
on the US formula 7,6 15,1
on the G20 formula 5,7 17,8
2.  Overall Trade Distorting Support [b]
The Uruguay final bound commitments 55,0 149,0
Effective amounts in 2004 23,0 74,0
Estimated amounts in 2006-2010 18.0 [c] 40,0
The Doha final bound commitments: proposals based
on the EC formula 22,0 44,7
on the US formula 25,9 37,3
on the G20 formula 13,8 29,8
Notes [a] Unknown (depend on world price evolution).
[b] Sum of the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), "de minimis"
subsidies and Blue Box subsidies.
[c] Estimate based on the USDA Farm Bill 2007 Proposal.
Sources EC, G20 and US proposals.
Penn 2005, Jales and Nassar 2006, Kutas 2006.
Table 6
Domestic support in the EC and the US  
(billion US dollors)
Sources: EC, G20 and US propos ls. Penn 2005, Jales and Nassar 2006,  
Kutas 2006.
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Round fail. This is an illusion. The Doha 
Round―even if unsuccessful―has given a de-
finitive stroke to the current CAP. Firstly, 
the anti-farmer bias of the tiered formula is 
a blunt mirror of the true balance between 
farm and food products that all the Member 
states’ Agriculture Ministers have agreed to.
Secondly, the Doha negotiations are mak-
ing European farmers increasingly aware of 
the fact that the impact of common Euro-
pean tariffs varies with each Member state’s 
production structure. A Member state pro-
ducing mostly farm goods protected by high 
EC tariffs is, on average, “more” protected 
than a Member state producing mostly farm 
goods protected by low or moderate EC tar-
iffs. Table 7 illustrates this point by weight-
ing the Member states’ production by the 
EC-wide level of protection (be it measured 
by tariffs or by the combined protection 
granted by tariffs and subsidies as measured 
by the OECD “producer support equiva-
lents”). 
Table 7 shows that, on average, farmers 
in Ireland are roughly twice as protected as 
those in Southern European Member states, 
simply because the Irish production is much more con-
centrated (compared to the Southern European produc-
tion) in such farm products that are the most protected 
by the EC. A “uniform” protection on all the farm prod-
ucts would be politically appealing to European farmers 
(it would be much fairer). It would be economically in-
teresting for them (it would induce them to produce the 
crops in which they are best, not for which they receive 
high subsidies). And it would be beneficial to the Euro-
pean consumers since it would enhance not only farm 
efficiency, but also food diversity.
Ironically, Table 7 shows that, contrary to a wide be-
lief, French farmers are not among the most protected 
in Europe. French farmers would be among the key 
beneficiaries of successful Doha negotiations in agri-
culture for two combined reasons. They would benefit 
from rebalanced tariffs, since they would be less disad-
vantaged than with the EC tiered offer. And, as they are 
often among the most efficient in Europe, they will be 
among the major beneficiaries from a deep CAP reform, 
as illustrated by the sugar case. Some French farmers are 
beginning to realize this, and to wonder whether they 
should not support a swift CAP reform.
5. Concluding Summary
The recent (November 2006) Commission’s proposal 
to negotiate bilaterals with no less than 24 countries 
is embarking Europe into very dangerous waters. The 
danger becomes clearly visible when the bilaterals un-
der negotiation or consideration by five other countries 
(Chile, Japan, Korea, Singapore and the US) are used as 
benchmarks. In sharp contrast with the bilaterals envis-
aged so far by these countries, the bilaterals considered 
by the EC are characterized by high tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers in goods, and by restrictive regulations in serv-
ices and investment.
Bilaterals so heavily dominated by substantial trade 
preferences raise two major problems. The first is a dip-
lomatic challenge, particularly in the case of a failure 
of the Doha Round. Why would the targeted partners 
be willing to open their protected markets to European 
exporters, and at the same time keep them closed to 
the exporters from the rest of the world? Secondly, if 
such bilaterals have some substance (a big “if ” because 
of the diplomatic challenge) they would favour the in-
Table 7.  Level of protection by EC Member state [a]
Member states
% index % index
Austria 59 103 22,9 98
Belgium 57 99 22,7 97
Britain 72 126 25,5 109
Czech Rep 57 99 26,6 114
Denmark 54 94 26,1 112
Estonia 55 96 27,2 117
Finland 72 126 26,5 114
France 59 103 21,6 93
Germany 61 106 24,5 105
Greece 40 70 18,7 80
Hungary 44 77 23,5 101
Ireland 99 173 26,2 112
Italy 45 79 19,1 82
Latvia 59 103 25,3 108
Lithuania 62 108 26,6 114
Luxembourg 75 131 25,6 110
Malta 37 65 18,6 80
Netherlands 53 93 19,1 82
Poland 47 82 24,5 105
Portugal 43 75 18,3 78
Slovakia 54 94 25,2 108
Slovenia 57 99 21,2 91
Spain 43 75 19,1 82
Sweden 71 124 25,5 109
EC-15 55 96 21,9 94
EC-25 57 100 23,3 100
Sources: OECD, WTO. Messerlin 2006.
[a] There is no available information on Cyprus' farm sector.
[b] PSE:Producer support equivalents in 2002, OECD.
[c] Ad valorem tariffs in 2004 (specific tariffs excluded).
PSEs [b] Tariffs [c]
Table 7
Level of protection by EC Member state [a]
Sources: OECD, WTO, Messerlin 2006.
[a] There is no available information on Cyprus’ farmsector.
[b] PSA: Producer support equivalents in 2002, OECD.
[c] Ad valorem tariffs in 2004 (specific tariffs excluded).
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efficient firms of the EC partners at the detriment of 
the European consumers of highly protected European 
goods and services (and vice versa for the partners’ con-
sumers). And they would force European producers to 
undergo the painful adjustments required by the erosion 
of preferences (and possibly of their associated rents) 
when the partners would eventually open their markets 
to countries other than the EC (and vice versa for the 
partners’ producers).
Costs and frustrations are thus the outcome to be 
expected from the Commission’s proposal. Worst of all, 
the Commission’s proposal could trigger a world race 
to bilaterals by pushing the US and other rapidly grow-
ing large emerging countries to make bilaterals between 
themselves―marginalizing even more a European econo-
my handicapped by its sluggish growth.
Turning to the Doha Round, the paper argues that 
the EC trade negotiators in industrial goods (NAMA) 
should (have) aim(ed) at achieving what the European 
business community is asking for―namely no single indus-
trial tariff above 15 percent. Such a target makes good 
economic sense. It would eliminate the tariff peaks that 
constitute the main obstacle faced by the European ex-
porters, and that generate most of the protection costs 
imposed on the world consumers. It would vastly in-
crease the certainty of access to the emerging countries’ 
markets for the European exporters―an outcome that 
negotiators heavily undervalue, while the business com-
munity is insisting on it. And, it should make it easier to 
negotiate exceptions as simple and as predictable as pos-
sible, hence to generate a “clean” Doha Agreement.
Focusing on the nine major emerging countries, the 
paper gives a concrete sense of the changes in protection 
associated to this 15 percent target (using a base Swiss 
coefficient of 25) and to simple and predictable excep-
tions (using Swiss coefficients of 40 and 60 for the 2 and 
4, respectively, percent of tariff lines with the highest 
pre-Doha tariffs). The emerging countries would then 
exhibit average bound tariffs ranging from 6.7 to 14.7 
percent, with a maximum bound tariff of 50 percent 
(but only a tiny portion of the bound tariffs would be 
higher than 30 percent). Effective cuts in average ap-
plied tariffs are limited to three emerging countries, but 
the average tariff water would be eliminated or reduced 
to a low level in all the others – a result that would be 
highly valued by the business community.
The Doha negotiations in “agriculture” are domi-
nated by two not very well-known―but crucial―facts. 
Firstly, the negotiations deal with many more agro-in-
dustrial (“food”) products than farm products. Only a 
quarter of the tariff lines involved are farm products, all 
the other products are food (semi-processed or proc-
essed). Secondly, the tariff cuts offered by the current 
EC proposal protect food producers more than farmers: 
the post-Doha average tariffs would be 10.7 percent for 
farm products, compared to 16.9 percent for processed 
food, while the post-Doha maximum tariffs would be 
43.7 and 105.7 percent, respectively. Last but not least, 
the EC food products that would remain the most pro-
tected items after the Doha Round would be a strange 
hodgepodge of waste products (dog and cat food, whey, 
etc), goods with very little potential in international 
trade (yoghurts) or with questionable importance (cu-
cumbers, gherkins, etc).
In such a context, “rebalancing” the current EC tar-
iff proposal―cutting the high tariffs more, and the low 
tariffs less―is an attractive alternative. As shown in de-
tail in section 4, it would deliver more economic welfare 
gains to the European consumers than the current EC 
proposal. And, it would deliver political benefits, since a 
vast majority of EC farm and food producers (all those 
protected by small and moderate tariffs) would find the 
rebalancing of the EC tariff proposal favourable for their 
interests, compared to the current EC offer.
Last but not least, all these results would meet the 
two key criteria imposed on the Doha Round―namely, 
the “less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments” con-
dition, and the “comparably high level of ambition in market 
access for Agriculture and NAMA” condition―much better 
than the current EC proposal. And the approach adopt-
ed in the paper can easily be extended to the countries 
not examined, such as the developing countries, which 
are not emerging economies or among the least-devel-
oped economies.
All the above suggestions assume that the EC is ready 
to position itself as a WTO Member, by taking a long-
term view of the world trade regime. They also implicitly 
assume that other Rounds will follow a successful Doha 
Round. Those future Rounds will take over the unfinished 
business left by (perhaps) a more modest but “clean” (i e, 
based on simple and predictable exceptions) Doha out-
come much more easily than if they inherit a more ambi-
tious Doha package for some products, which is riddled 
with more distorting exceptions on many more prod-
ucts. In short, the EC long-term interest is to promote 
the notion of a series of WTO Rounds of liberalization as 
a patient “peeling of the protectionist onion”.29
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Notes
 European Commission 2006.1. 
Wallenberg 2006; Seillières 2006.2. 
This sub-section relies heavily on Messerlin 2007a.3. 
A regional trade agreement rapidly becomes equivalent to a 4. 
large number of bilaterals. For instance, the EC in 1958 could be 
considered as equivalent to 6 bilaterals in goods (in trade in goods, 
the initial EC consisted in four customs territories, Benelux being 
one such territory) and to 15 bilaterals in services (in trade in 
services, the initial EC consisted in six countries).
Indeed, there is a clear shift away from customs unions and 5. 
towards free trade areas between the pre- and post-1995 periods.
Indeed, there is little evidence of a US change of approach in 6. 
terms of bilaterals. The US Administration has taken few initia-
tives in terms of bilaterals (Australia or Korea) and these initia-
tives were fundamentally driven by foreign policy motives (the 
Irak war). At this juncture, the US has no pending “grand vision” 
in terms of bilaterals. The Free Trade Area for the Americas looks 
like a sleeping beauty, the US calls for an Asian Pacific initiative are 
incantatory but inconsequential, while the China-US dialogue will 
most probably reduce the current trade flows between Asia and 
the US, be it via exchange rate adjustments by Asian trading part-
ners or via US retaliatory measures. Lastly, the ordeals to get the 
recent bilaterals approved by the US Congress and the mood of 
the newly elected Congress (revealed by the request for a review 
of the bilaterals demanded by the new Democrat majority) do not 
suggest that strategic changes are on the agenda.
See for instance Evenett 2007 about the 2006 Commission’s 7. 
proposal.
 Doing Business 2006.8. 
Messerlin 2007a.9. 
 Washington Trade Daily, 31 January 2007, page 1.10. 
 To be fair, President Bush’s statement may also be part of 11. 
the fight between the Administration and the Congress on the 
extension of the Trade Promotion Authority in the Doha Round 
context, and it remains to be seen whether the Korea-US trade 
agreement will be ratified by Congress.
 Bhagwati 1995.12. 
 A detailed version of this section can be found in Messerlin 2007b.13.
 The basic Swiss formula is T = [rt/(r+t)] where ‘t’ is the initial 14. 
tariffs, ‘T’ the post-negotiation tariffs, and ‘r’ the reduction coef-
ficient (hereafter the “Swiss coefficient”). The Swiss coefficient is 
thus the only element to negotiate on. In what follows, the expres-
sion “a Swiss60” means a Swiss coefficient of 60. A variant of the 
basic formula could be T = rt/(r― + t―)1/― where ‘―’ is a “political” 
coefficient (to be negotiated) aiming to reduce tariff cuts in the 
low tariff range, hence to boost political support–a feature that 
could be particularly useful for the negotiations in the agricultural 
products (see below). I would like to thank Jean Messerlin for hav-
ing suggested this variant.
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 This necessity has induced negotiators to use the term “flex-15. 
ibilities.” But, the term “exceptions” better describes the economic 
consequences of such flexibilities.
 Out of the 143 WTO Members on which there is available 16. 
information, 104 Members enforce applied tariffs lower than 
their bound tariffs, with 70 of them having an average tariff water 
higher than 10 percent. In some cases, tariff water can reach 
impressing average levels (about 100 percent) [WTO 2006]. Out 
of these 70 countries, 21 can be classified as emerging economies, 
the rest being developing countries.
 UNICE 2006.17. 
 China’s membership of Group I is an indirect way of reflecting 18. 
its recent accession to the WTO.
 Under WTO rules, “bound” tariffs are the only ones, which 19. 
cannot be raised without compensating the affected trading part-
ners; hence they are the only ones to deliver the legal certainty 
that is so crucial to good business practices. Although Table 2 is 
based on tariff data more aggregated (at the 6 digit level of the 
Harmoinzed System) than those used by the negotiators, it pro-
vides a good view of the situation, despite a few underestimated 
tariff peaks.
 A detailed version of this section can be found in Messerlin 20. 
2007b.
 Moreover, awkward discontinuities appear at the points 21. 
connecting two different tiers. For instance, an initial tariff of 
89 percent would be cut to a post-Doha tariff of 44.5 percent, 
whereas an initial tariff of 91 percent would be cut to a post-Doha 
tariff of 36.4 percent. Such discontinuities make it hard to get an 
agreement on defining the various tiers, and they fuel the need of 
exceptions to accommodate such an agreement.
 The concordance table used has been established by the US 22. 
Department of Agriculture. It splits the whole universe of the “ag-
ricultural” products into four subsets: the bulk farm commodities, 
the produce/horticulture products, the semi-processed products 
and the processed products.
 It is expressed in Swiss-type terms for reasons already men-23. 
tioned, but it should be stressed that it could be presented with a 
tiered formula (it is always possible to approximate a curve by a 
sequence of straight lines) though at the cost of discontinuities and 
complexities as those illustrated above in Figure 1.
 For the sake of information, Table 4 includes the case of a 24. 
Swiss50. Such a Swiss coefficient may create problems in the farm 
products, but interestingly, the political balance may still be posi-
tive in the processed food products.
 For a general analysis of trade liberalization in the case of 25. 
tariff-rate quotas, see Martin 2007.
A Swiss70 may be perceived as a too narrow exception for 26. 
coping with European pressure groups. Then, one could discuss 
a higher Swiss coefficient (such as a Swiss100) for a very small 
percentage of tariff lines (an approach symmetrical to the one 
adopted in NAMA).
 German Marshall Fund 2006.27. 
 OECD 2004.28. 
 Messerlin 2007a.29. 













































Annex Table 8 
Bound and applied tariffs, selected advanced and emerging economies
Sources: Forbes et al 2004, WTO Secretariat 2007.
Annex: The set of tariff data in 
NAMA
The Table below summarizes the tariff data used for 
presenting the alternative proposal in NAMA (section 
3). As these data are defined at a level (Harmonised Sys-
tem 6 digit), which is more aggregated than the level 
used by the negotiators30 the results presented in the 
paper do not reflect a few tariff peaks. That said, the 
calculations include already so many tariff lines that the 
averages presented are likely to offer a good view of the 
situation. 
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Harvard University
Ms. Ruth Richardson – former Minister of Finance, 
New Zealand
Mr. Christopher Roberts – Covington & Burling/ 
European Service Forum
Dr. Jim Rollo – Professor, University of Sussex
Dr. Gary Sampson – Professor, Melbourne Business 
School
Mr. Clive Stanbrook – Partner, McDemott, Will & 
Emery
Mr. Andrew Stoler – Executive Director, Institute  
for International Trade, University of Adelaide,  
Australia; former Deputy Director General of  
WTO (1999–2002)
Mr. Bob Vastine – President, Coalition of Service  
Industries
Mr. Edwin Vermulst – Partner, Vermulst, Verhaeghe & 
Graafsma Advocaten
Ms. Catherine Windels – Director, Pfizer
Dr. Steven Woolcock – Director of the International 
Trade Policy Unit, London School of Economics
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The European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) is an independent 
and non-profit policy research think tank dedicated to trade policy and other international econo-
mic policy issues of importance to Europe. ECIPE is rooted in the classical tradition of free trade 
and an open world economic order. ECIPE’s intention is to subject international economic policy, 
particularly in Europe, to rigorous scrutiny of costs and benefits, and to present conclusions in 
a concise, readily accessible form to the European public. We aim to foster a “culture of evalua-
tion” – largely lacking in Europe – so that better public awareness and understanding of complex 
issues in concrete situations can lead to intelligent discussion and improved policies. That will be 
ECIPE’s contribution to a thriving Europe in an open world.
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